双渠道低碳供应链合作减排与促销决策模型
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上海理工大学 管理学院,上海理工大学 管理学院,上海理工大学 管理学院

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F272

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国家自然科学基金;上海市高原学科建设项目“管理科学与工程”;上海高校青年教师培养资助计划项目;上海市哲学社会科学规划课题


Cooperative Reduction and Promotion Decision Model in Dual Channel Supply Chain
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    摘要:

    研究了一个努力减排的制造商和一个努力促销的零售商组成的双渠道供应链的减排与促销决策问题。首先建立了分散决策和集中决策下供应链成员的Stackelberg博弈模型,表明集中决策会激励制造商努力减排、零售商努力促销及提高供应链整体的利润。为此提出了合作减排、合作促销和成本互担的三种合作模式,分别构建博弈模型来分析均衡解。研究表明:三种合作方式分别在不同的条件下,能提高供应链及各成员的利润;但是合作减排方式不能激励零售商努力促销,合作促销方式不能激励制造商努力减排,而成本互担方式能同时激励制造商努力减排水平和零售商努力促销。最后通过数值仿真,验证了模型的有效性,并对比分析了三种合作方式下消费者对直销渠道的偏好对供应链成员利润的影响。

    Abstract:

    This paper analyzes the cooperative carbon emission reduction and low-carbon promotion in a dual-channel supply chain involved one manufacturer and one retailer. Assuming that demands were affected by the manufacturer’s reduction and the retailer’s promotion, a Stackelberg game dominated by the manufacturer is established which indicates that the centralized decision will encourage manufacturers to make more efforts to reduce the emission, the retailer to make more efforts to promote and improve the profit of the whole supply chain. Then three contract models of cooperation reduction, cooperation promotion and cost sharing are put forward and the game models are constructed to analyze the equilibrium solution. Research shows that three ways of contract under different conditions can all improve the supply chain; however, the contract of cooperation reduction cannot motivate the retailer to make more efforts to promote, the contract of cooperation promotion cannot incentive the manufacturer to make more efforts to reduce the emission, but the contract of cost sharing can both motivate the manufacturer to take more efforts to reduce emissions and the retailer to make more efforts to promote. A further research is carried on that the validity of the models are verified by numerical simulation, and the effect of the consumer"s preference on direct channel on the supply chain members" profits are compared and analyzed in three contracts. Our key contribution lies in modeling the there contrasts under different conditions to coordinate the relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer.

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黄书真,徐福缘,何建佳.双渠道低碳供应链合作减排与促销决策模型[J].,2017,(17).

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  • 收稿日期:2016-11-17
  • 最后修改日期:2017-08-25
  • 录用日期:2017-01-18
  • 在线发布日期: 2017-09-20
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