公益性PPP项目特许期与政府补贴机制设计

The Concession Period and Government’s Compensation Mechanism for Commonweal PPP Project

摘要:

为了解决如何使公益性PPP项目的特许期决策和政府补偿机制在满足投资者预期收益的同时实现社会效益最大化目标的问题,考虑私人方风险偏好条件下,以私人方服务质量作为特许期与政府补偿的决策依据,建立政府方与私人方之间的Stackelberg博弈模型。运用逆推归纳法,政府首先依据私人方在自身效益最大化下付出的努力水平与投入的建设成本来确定在满足私人方最低保留效用时的年固定补贴实际成本,然后求出在满足净社会效益最大化时应设置的最优特许期与私人方努力绩效的分配比例,进而得出政府支付给私人方的最优年补贴成本及最优特许期限,从而实现双方共赢。最后,为了更直观的对结论进行验证,引入实际案例,并运用matlab软件对数据进行分析,并根据数值分析的结果,揭示了政府对特许期与年补贴费用决策的一些反直觉特性,得到的结果更具有现实意义。

Abstract:

In order to solve the question of how to make the decision of the concession period and government’s compensation mechanism of commonweal PPP project not only can meet investors expected earnings, but also realize the objective of social benefit maximization. Considering the private party’s risk appetite, this article add the service quality to the concession period and the government compensation decision, and then, establish Stackelberg game model between government party and a private party. Using reverse induction, at first, the government made the decision of the in fixed subsidies actual cost which can meet the private party minimum reservation utility based on the effort level and investment of construction cost which can make the private party realize their own benefit maximization. And then the author work out to the optimal concession period and the optimal distribution ratio of the private party performance under meeting the social benefit maximization. Thus it is concluded that the government optimal subsidies cost and optimal concession period, so as to realize the win-win situation. Finally, in order to verify this conclusion more intuitive, the author introduced a real case, and using matlab software to analyze data. According to the result of numerical analysis, it reveals some counter-intuitive properties of the decision of government subsidies annual cost and concession period, and the result also has more practical significance.