企业风险厌恶视角下政府补贴对企业创新行为的影响机制研究

The impact of Subsidies on Firm’s Innovative Behavior Based on Risk-averse View

摘要:

目前关于政府补贴和企业创新行为的主流观点是激励效应,挤出效应以及倒“U”型的效应,这样的观点是基于企业风险中性的假设。本文引入了企业风险厌恶的前提,在该前提下,企业在接受了政府补贴后是否会受到研发激励基于企业的逆向选择行为,导致政府补贴对企业创新投入的影响是不确定的,而与企业异质化的创新投入有关。理论和实证结果显示,补贴对存在异质化创新投入的企业的效应是不确定的,这种不确定的效应随企业创新投入的变化而发生改变。政府可以通过企业的研发投入规模来甄别存在逆向选择行为的企业,依据企业的研发投入规模来进行选择性补贴,从而提高政府研发补贴的效率。

Abstract:

The mainstream viewpoints about government subsidies on firm’s innovative behavior are focused on stimulating effect,crowding effect and inverted U effect. However, they are all based on the assumption that firms are risk-neutral. This paper innovatively introduces risk-averse assumption, and finds that the impact of subsidies on firm’s innovative behavior is uncertain due to firm’s adverse selection. The theoretic and empirical results both show that the uncertain impact changes with the firm’s innovation input, and so government could hereby select which firms to subsidize in order to improve the subsidy efficiency.