考虑政府补贴的产业共性技术协同创新博弈分析

Government subsidies and Industrial Generic Technology Collaborative Innovation Game Analysis

摘要:

在考虑政府补贴的情况下,基于Stackelberg博弈理论和Nash均衡理论,构建包含政府、企业、研发机构在内的四种博弈模型,对不同模型下的价格、产品创新度和利润情况进行了比较分析。研究发现：企业主导市场的情况下,产品销售价格、创新度和利润都不占优势,创新效率最低；政府主导模型中非均等化补贴可以使价格、产品创新度和利润等指标均达到最优化。

Abstract:

The commodity attribute of industrial generic technology has been analyzed．By using the Stackelberg game theory and Nash equilibrium theory,four kinds of game models,including government,enterprises,R D institutions,and so on,are put forwarded．The price,innovation and profit of different models are compared and analyzed．the findings are showed：in the innovation of industrial generic technology,it is necessary to coordinate the behavior of multiple subjects,Under certain conditions,The government led collaborative model can achieve optimization in price,innovation and profit,Based on above,When the distribution of benefits is reasonable,each partner"s earnings are higher than before．