总经理离任前的公司研发投入变动研究

A Research on the Changes of the R&D Investment before the Departure of General Manager

摘要:

以2007-2015年我国A股上市公司为样本，研究总经理离任前是否会削减研发投入，并从“想不想”（行为动机）和“能不能”（个人权力）两方面分组检验。结果发现：总经理离任与上年度研发投入负相关；当总经理未持有本公司股份或兼任董事长时，其具有离任前削减研发的动机、权力，两者负相关关系显著成立；当总经理持有公司股份或未兼任董事长时，其离任前削减研发的动机、权力受限，两者负相关关系不成立。本研究发现了总经理持股和两职合一在总经理离任前消极研发行为中的关键作用,为公司获取长期利益提供了新的证据。

关键词:总经理离任;研发投入;高管持股;两职合一;短视行为

Abstract:

Taking the Chinese A-share companies from 2007 to 2015 as the sample,this research studies whether the general manager would negative the R&D investment, and tests that from “want or not” ( behavioral motive ) and ”can or not”( individual power ) two aspects. The result turns out that the general manager’s departure negatively related to the last year’s R&D investment. When the general manager does not hold shares in the company or concurrently is the chairman of the board, has the motives and power to reduce the R&D investment. The negative relationship is significant. When the general manager holds shares in the company or is not the chairman of the board, the motives and power to reduce the R&D investment are limited. The negative relationship is not established. This study finds that the general manager shareholding and general manager duality play the the key roles in the relationship between general manager’s departure and the native behavior of the R&D investment, and provides new evidence for the long-term interests.

Key words:general manager departure; R&D investment; top manager shareholding; general manager duality; myopia behavior