Abstract:Taking the Chinese A-share companies from 2007 to 2015 as the sample,this research studies whether the general manager would negative the R&D investment, and tests that from “want or not” ( behavioral motive ) and ”can or not”( individual power ) two aspects. The result turns out that the general manager’s departure negatively related to the last year’s R&D investment. When the general manager does not hold shares in the company or concurrently is the chairman of the board, has the motives and power to reduce the R&D investment. The negative relationship is significant. When the general manager holds shares in the company or is not the chairman of the board, the motives and power to reduce the R&D investment are limited. The negative relationship is not established. This study finds that the general manager shareholding and general manager duality play the the key roles in the relationship between general manager’s departure and the native behavior of the R&D investment, and provides new evidence for the long-term interests.