基于动态演化博弈视角的技术赶超研究

Technological catching-up Based on Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory

摘要:

技术落后地区(国)在进行技术赶超的过程中,频繁出现经济持续发展、技术存量增加,但是无法实现技术赶超的现象,即出现了与技术领先地区(国)保持差距的赶超停滞。本文通过建立技术领先地区(国)和技术落后地区(国)之间的动态演化博弈模型,探讨了双方博弈的稳定状态,研究表明,后发优势的存在使得技术落后地区(国)经济和技术水平不断提高,虽然单纯的技术模仿不能实现赶超,但是发展中国家却仍然在走技术模仿道路,而技术领先地区(国)也会采取不阻碍其赶超的策略,因为该状态是有利于整个社会经济持续发展的最优化状态,为双方的策略选择和政策制定提供了理论依据。

Abstract:

In the process of technological catching-up for developing region, economic development and technical stock increase, but technological catching-up cannot be achieved. That is, technological gap is kept, and technological catching-up is stopped. In this paper, the dynamic evolutionary game model between the leading region and developing region is established, and the stability of the game is discussed. The results show that the existence of the backward advantage makes the economic and technological level of the developing region increase continuously. Although the mere imitation of technology cannot achieve catching-up, the developing regions are still taking this road, and the leading region will adopt “not hinder” strategy. It is good for the entire social of economic development. This paper provides the theoretical basis for the strategy selection and policy formulation.