政府补贴下生态农业技术创新扩散机制*———基于“公司 合作社 农户”模式的演化博弈分析

The Eco-agricultural Technique Innovation Diffusion Mechanisms Under the Government Subsidies ——Based on the evolutionary game analysis of “company cooperative peasant household” Model

摘要:

生态农业技术创新扩散是生态农业发展的动力和源泉,而“公司 合作社 农户”是我国现阶段农业产业化发展的理想模式。本文借助演化博弈理论工具,将公司、合作社及农户同时纳入研究框架,构建了政府补贴环境下生态农业技术创新扩散的博弈模型,并对均衡点的稳定性进行了分析,运用数值仿真的方法分析了参数变动和不同初始条件对演化结果的影响。研究表明：博弈主体选择积极生态策略时的收益增量与成本投入关系对系统演化轨迹将产生重大影响；政府补贴可有效降低生态农业技术实现创新扩散的条件,但一定情况下补贴作用将失灵；农户的风险规避特征及消费者对生态农产品的偏好均会对系统演化的结果产生影响,农户较高的风险规避度和消费者较低的偏好水平都将导致生态农业技术创新扩散的失败。

Abstract:

Eco-agricultural technique innovation diffusion is the driving force for the development of ecological agriculture, and the model,“company cooperative peasant household”, is an ideal model of our present agricultural industrialization development. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper has encompassed company, cooperative and peasant household into the research framework to construct an eco-agricultural technique innovation diffusion game model with the help of government subsidies, and the stability of the equilibrium was also analyzed. In this paper, numerical simulation method is used to analyze the impact on the evolution result when the parameters or the initial conditions were changed. The research shows that the revenue increment and cost-input relationship would have a significant impact on system evolution track when the game-agent adopts proactive ecological strategy; The government subsidies can effectively reduce the conditions of realizing the innovation diffusion of eco-agricultural technique, while under certain circumstances, the subsidy effect will be out of order; Both of the risk-averse feature of peasant household and consumers" preference for eco-agricultural products would have an impact on the evolution result, the high risk-averse feature or low consumers" preference level would lead to the failure of the eco-agricultural technique innovation diffusion.