基于再制造闭环供应链视角的低碳减排研究

Research on low carbon emission reduction from the perspective of remanufacturing closed loop supply chain

摘要:

以正向的低碳产品销售和逆向的废旧低碳产品回收均为正态分布的市场环境为背景，以Stackelberg博弈理论为方法，以均值-方差法为工具，构建了销售商驱动的第三方回收低碳风险再制造闭环供应链模型，分析研究了零和博弈和集中决策下低碳再制造闭环供应链中制造商、销售商、第三方回收商期望效用的函数关系，碳减排能力、碳税、风险规避程度等参数变量对供应链的影响作用。研究结果表明：1）零和博弈下，供应链没有达到集中决策模型中的最优销售价、最优回收价和最优期望效用，不能自动实现供应链的协调。2）与不进行低碳减排治理相比，制造商进行低碳减排治理时，低碳产品的影子制造成本增加，供应链正向渠道的期望效用降低。3）低碳减排能力的提升能够降低销售价和影子制造成本，提高市场占有率和供应链的期望效用。4）碳税的增加会抬高销售价和影子制造成本，降低市场占有率和供应链的期望效用。5）风险规避程度的增大减少供应链的期望效用。最后，设计正向渠道收益共享、逆向渠道风险共担契约，克服双重边际效应的不利影响，实现了低碳再制造闭环供应链的协调；并通过数值仿真研究和灵敏度分析，验证了低碳再制造闭环供应链模型的有效性及实用性。为供应链上下游企业开展低碳减排合作提供了理论依据和政策建议。

Abstract:

In the background of normal distribution of the market environment, a retailer driven low carbon risk remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain model with third party recyclers was constructed by using Stackelberg game theory method and the mean variance method. The expected utility functions of the manufacturer, retailer and third party recyclers, and the influences of carbon emission capacity, carbon tax, risk aversion were analyzed in the zero-sum game model and the centralized decision-making. The results show that: 1) in the zero-sum game, the supply chain does not reach the optimal selling price, the optimal recovery price and the optimal expected utility of the benchmarking model, and can not automatically achieve the coordination. 2) compared with the non low carbon emission reduction government, the shadow manufacturing cost of low-carbon products increases when the manufacturer carries on low-carbon emission reduction, and the expected utility of the supply chain is reduced. 3) the promotion of low carbon emission reduction capability can reduce the selling price and shadow manufacturing cost, increase the market share and the expected utility of the supply chain. 4) the increase of carbon tax will raise selling price and shadow manufacturing cost, reduce market share and expected utility of supply chain. 5) the increase of risk aversion will reduce the expected utility of supply chain. Finally, the contracts of the forward channel revenue sharing and reverse channel risk sharing were designed to overcome the double marginal influence, and the coordination of the low remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain was achieved. Also, through numerical simulation and sensitivity analysis, the validity and practicability of the low-carbon remanufacturing closed loop supply chain model are verified. It provides the theoretical basis and policy recommendations for the cooperation between the upstream and downstream enterprises of the supply chain to carry out low-carbon emission.