基于第三方回收的政府补贴与奖惩机制的比较研究

A Comparative Study of Government Subsidy and Reward-penalty Mechanism Based on Third-party Recycling

摘要:

为比较政府补贴和奖惩机制对供应链的影响效果，根据Stackberg博弈方法建立逆向供应链的3种决策模型：无政府参与的供应链模型、政府补贴机制下的供应链模型和政府奖惩机制下的供应链模型，分别分析不同机制的效果，同时进行对比研究。研究结果表明：补贴和奖惩机制均能够有效激励供应链的回收积极性，而且回收商都是最大受益者；制造商的利润取决于奖惩力度或补贴力度的大小；较补贴机制，奖惩机制有着更高的回收率和供应链整体效益。

Abstract:

In order to compare the effects of government subsidy and reward-penalty mechanism on the supply chain，three kinds of models are established according to Stackberg game, they are supply chain models, which without government participation, under government subsidies mechanism and under the reward-penalty mechanism. The paper analyzes the effects of these mechanisms and conducts a comparative study. The results show that, subsidies and incentive mechanisms can effectively stimulate the supply chain recovery enthusiasm, and the recyclers are the biggest beneficiaries; manufacturer''s profits depend on the price of reward-penalty or the subsidy; compared with the subsidies mechanism, the reward-penalty mechanism has a higher return rate and the whole supply chain efficiency.