为提高政府投资工程质量监管效率,降低道德风险,在提出质量飞检模式的基础上,将系统动力学和演化博弈动态复制理念相结合,针对飞检单位、承包商和监理单位的三方博弈行为建立了SD演化博弈模型并反映了三方主体相互影响路径,分析表明不存在演化稳定均衡点。同时通过SD演化博弈对最优飞检率进行仿真,结果显示最优飞检率和飞检样本总量并无关联,且在该飞检率下承包商的履约程度可达最大值。最后从飞检时间的随机性和不备性、组织构成、内容等方面对质量飞检模式的应用提出了相应的管理提升建议。

In order to improve the efficiency of quality supervision and reduce moral hazard for the government investment project, the paper combines system dynamics and evolutionary game dynamic replication concepts , and establishes SD evolution game model among the unannounced inspection unit, contractor and supervising unit based On the basis of quality unannounced inspection mode, the model reflects the path of mutual influence for three parties, and results show that evolutionary equilibrium is not existed. Meanwhile, the optimal unannounced inspection rate was simulated through SD evolution game, The simulation results shows that the optimal unannounced inspection rate and the total number of samples are not correlated, and the contractor"s performance can reach the maximum under the rate. Finally, the paper puts forward some Suggestions for the application of quality unannounced inspection mode in the aspects of randomness and unreadiness of inspection time, organization composition and content.

N945.13

国家自然科学基金(71402045)