Abstract:This paper studies the retailer’ information sharing in green product design by the manufacturer in a green supply chain, which includes the development-intensive green product (DIGP) and margin cost-intensive green product (MIGP). We develop central centralized decision-making model and centralized decision-making models which contain information sharing and no information sharing. We obtain that, by comparing Bayes equilibria in different cases, when the retailer share optimistic forecast information, the wholesale price and retail price increase, the DIGP’s greenness increase, but MIGP’s greenness remain unchanged; with the increase of the prediction accuracy, the manufacturer and the retailer’s expected profits raise; information sharing benefits the manufacturer while hurt the retailer himself; information sharing will make the MIGP supply chain suffer a loss; if the greenness is moderate, information sharing benefits the DIGP supply chain, otherwise, it hurts the DIGP supply chain. Finally, we coordinate the supply chain using the improved K-S method, which not only motivates the retailer to share information, but also increase the total expected profit of the supply chain to the centralized decision-making.