市场细分和专利保护下制造商与再制造商的博弈策略研究

Research on the Game Strategies for the Manufacturer and the Remanufacturer under Market Segmentation and Patent Protection

摘要:

考虑人们对再制造产品的偏好及市场中存在的专利模式,在细分普通消费者与绿色消费者的基础上,探讨了不同专利模式下制造商与再制造商的最优博弈策略,并结合数值算例分析了模型中关键参数(绿色消费者比例、普通消费者对再制造产品的接受程度)对均衡解及渠道成员利润的影响。研究表明：从环境绩效和消费者利益的角度分析,固定费用专利许可模式下的闭环供应链最优；从制造商与再制造商的角度分析,使用何种专利许可模式或定价策略取决于不同的条件。

Abstract:

Considering the preference of remanufacturing products and the patent model existing in the market, this paper discusses the optimal game strategy between the manufacturer and the remanufacturer in different patent models on the basis of subdividing the ordinary consumers and the green consumers. The numerical examples analyze the influence of the key parameters (the ratio of green consumers and the acceptance degree of the average consumer to the remanufactured products) on the equilibrium solution and the profit of the channel members. The results show that: from the perspective of environmental performance and consumer interests, the closed-loop supply chain under the fixed-cost patent licensing model is optimal; from the perspective of the manufacturer and the remanufacturer, the use of the patent licensing model or pricing strategy depends on the different conditions.