大股东、CEO薪酬激励与企业创新

Major shareholder, CEO Compensation Incentive and Enterprise Innovation

摘要:

本文选取2009年至2015年上市公司为研究样本,考查了薪酬激励缓解大股东对企业创新的负面影响的中介效应。Logit、Tobit模型与回归模型均发现大股东对企业创新的负面影响,CEO薪酬激励发挥部分中介效应,中介效应占总效应28%。CEO薪酬激励是非国有企业样本的完全中介变量。CEO薪酬是国有企业样本的部分中介变量,其持股未产生中介效应。研究结论表明提升上市公司薪酬激励水平是缓解大股东对企业创新的负面影响的重要途径,本文的研究发现为治理“一股独大”提供了经验证据与研究思路。

Abstract:

Taken listed companies from 2009 to 2015 as the research sample, this paper investigates the mediating effect of compensation incentives which can alleviate the largeshareholders’ negative impact on corporate innovation. Using logit model, tobit model and regression model, we find that largeshareholders have negative impact on corporate innovation. The results suggest that the CEO compensation incentive (individual salary and shareholding) plays a partial role of mediating effect and the mediating effect accounts for 28%. Meanwhile, the CEO compensation incentive is completelymediate in non-state-owned enterprises samples. In state-owned enterprises, CEO compensation is partial mediate, but CEO’s shareholdings don’t have mediating effect. Our findings shows that enhancing the level of compensation incentives is an important way to alleviate thelargeshareholders’ negative impact on corporate innovation. This paper provides empirical evidence and research ideas for the management of " One share dominates exclusively".