基于演化博弈理论建立制造商和经销商的动态博弈模型,分别研究了未引入质保机制和引入质保机制下制造商和经销商的决策选择和影响因素。根据制造商和经销商博弈呈现出的长期性和动态性,运用复制动态方程得到了两者行为的演化规律。研究结果表明没有引入质保机制时,再制造主体进行再制造博弈时,制造商和经销商有可能会陷入决策的囚徒困境,从而无法实现生产的最优决策,当引入了质保这样一个机制,经销商和制造商可以根据质保的调整进行决策的优化,最终实现生产决策的双重帕累托最优。

Based on the evolutionary game theory, the dynamic game model of the manufacturer and the dealer is established, and the decision choice and influencing factors of the manufacturer and the dealer under the introduction of the warranty mechanism and the introduction of the warranty mechanism are studied respectively. According to the long-term and dynamic of the game between the manufacturer and the dealer, the evolution law of the two is obtained by using the dynamic equation of replication. The results show that when the two remanufactured entities are remodeled without the introduction of the warranty mechanism, the manufacturer and the dealer may fall into the prisoner"s dilemma of decision making and thus can not achieve the optimal decision of production. When a mechanism such as a warranty is introduced, the dealer and the manufacturer can optimize the decision based on the adjustment of the warranty, and ultimately the two parties achieve their respective production

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国家自然科学“环境规制与企业生态技术创新激励：基于央地分权视角的理论与实证研究”(批准号：71573283)