大科学工程关键元器件采购质量控制研究

Study on Quality Control Contract of Key Components Procurement in Large Science projects

摘要:

大科学工程探索性的特点决定了其在建设过程中将采用大量的非标设备，尤其是非标关键元器件。由于大科学工程对于关键元器件的需求量大且要求高，国内能够作为大科学工程关键元器件供货商的厂商少之又少，导致了供应商的议价能力普遍较高且存在降低生产过程中投资水平的败德行为。针对此问题，本研究基于委托代理理论，研究了大科学工程关键元器件采购的质量控制契约设计问题。通过建立关键元器件外协供应商和购买商的期望收益函数模型，运用最优化原理，求解关键元器件外协供应商的最优生产过程投资水平，以及关键元器件购买商的最优质量检验水平和信息租金大小，并进行了算例分析。结果表明：当关键元器件外协供应商提高其生产过程投资水平时，其质量预防水平将提高，购买商的质量检验水平将显著下降；购买商可以通过支付信息租金的方式激励关键元器件外协供应商提高其生产过程投资水平，所支付的信息租金随着购买商质量检验水平的增加而呈现倒U型变化趋势。在完全信息条件下，即支付信息租金以后，关键元器件购买商和外协供应商组成两级供应链系统进行联合决策，如果为了最大程度的激励关键元器件外协供应商，显著提高其期望收益，购买商需要保持较高的质量检验水平，但自身的期望收益显著降低；如果为了提高供应链整体期望收益，购买商需要保持相对较低的质量检验水平，自身的期望收益虽不会大幅降低，但外协供应商的期望收益也不会大幅增加。

Abstract:

The exploration characteristic of large science projects determines that a large number of non-standard equipment will be used in the process of implementation, especially the non-standard key components. Due to the very small number of domestic key components suppliers, the suppliers of key components often have a strong voice, leading a reduction in the level of investment in the production process, which is called immoral behavior of suppliers. To solve this problem, this paper studies the quality control contract of key components procurement in large science projects based on the principal-agent theory. Through the establishment the expected return function model of key components suppliers and buyers, the optimization theory is used to solve the optimal investment level in production process of suppliers, the optimal quality inspection level of buyer, and the information rent of buyer. Results of a numerical example show that when the key components suppliers improve investment level, the quality prevention level of the key components suppliers will increase and the buyer’s quality inspection level will decrease. the buyer can encourage the key components suppliers to increase the investment level in production process by paying the information rent, the information rents presented an inverted U-shaped with the increase of the quality inspection level of buyers. Under the condition of complete information, the key components buyers and suppliers are composed of two echelon supply chain system for joint decision making. If in order to maximize the incentive for key components suppliers, significantly increasing the expected returns of the suppliers, buyers need to maintain a high-level quality inspection, but its expected returns decreased significantly; if in order to improve the overall supply chain expected returns, buyers need to maintain a relatively low-level quality inspection, the expected returns of the buyers is not significantly reduced, but the expected returns of suppliers will not significantly increased.