基于低碳偏好下的制造商信息收集与质量披露策略研究

Manufacturer’s Information Collection and Quality Disclosure Strategy Based on Low Carbon Preference

摘要:

为研究基于消费者低碳偏好下，供应链中制造商对于信息收集与质量披露策略选择的问题，文章建立了考虑消费者低碳偏好时的制造商和零售商之间的博弈模型。通过对信息收集和质量披露策略不同选择下供应链决策结果的比较，分析制造商在不同策略选择下的收益差异，得出了质量披露的成本和消费者低碳偏好差异程度和制造商策略选择之间的变化规律。最后，通过算例分析对于以上的结论进行了说明和验证。

Abstract:

Based on consumer's low carbon preference,this paper establishes a game model between manufacturer and retailer to investigate the manufacturer's choice of information collection and quality disclosure strategies in supply chains.By comparing the results of supply chain decision-making under different choices of information collection and quality disclosure strategies, this paper analyzes the differentiation of manufacturer's profit under different strategies and draws the change regulation of manufacturer’s strategies between cost of quality disclosure and the differentiation degree of consumer's low carbon preference. Finally a numerical example is given to verify the theoretical analysis results.