公众参与下环保PPP项目运营监管演化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis of environmental protection PPP project supervision in operational phase Based on Public Participation

摘要:

政府监管部门在PPP项目运营时职能缺位使得公众的权益受到危害,构建以社会私人部门、政府监管部门及公众为主体的环保PPP项目监管演化博弈模型,分析三方策略的影响因素及选择机制,并运用数值仿真展示了基于理想状态下各主体行为策略相互影响的演化过程。研究发现：博弈系统整体具有不稳健性,各主体行为策略受彼此相互影响。降低私人部门运营成本的同时加大外部监管、提高政府监管部门的上级问责制及技术水平,拓宽公众维权渠道的同时降低参与监督成本能够有效实现多赢。

Abstract:

The lack of functions of government supervision departments in the operation of PPP projects has jeopardized the public"s rights and interests. The influence factors and selection mechanism of the tripartite strategy are analyzed through the construction of the evolution game model of the environmental protection PPP project, which includes the social private sector, the government supervision department and the public. And the numerical simulation is used to show the evolutionary process of interaction between each agent"s behavior strategy based on the ideal state. The results show that game system has unsteadiness, and the behavior of each subject is affected by each other. Reducing the operating costs of the private sector while increasing external supervision, improving the accountability and technical level of the government regulatory authorities at higher levels and broadening the channels of public protection of rights while reducing the cost of participation in supervision can effectively achieve win-win.