长江经济带生态环境保护中政府与企业的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Enterprises in Eco-environmental Protection of the Yangtze River Economic Belt

摘要:

针对环境保护“费改税”背景下,长江经济带生态环境保护中政府与企业的策略选择问题,构建长江经济带生态环境保护政府监管的演化博弈模型,揭示了政府与企业间的策略变化。研究结果表明：政府监管成本、企业合法排污所增加的成本、企业合法排污所增加的收益、企业违法排污遭受的处罚等因素对政府与企业的策略选择有重要影响。在此基础上,提出建立长江经济带生态环境协同保护机制、充分发挥环境保护税的经济杠杆调节作用、实行最严格的长江经济带生态环境保护制度等对策建议。

Abstract:

Against the strategy choice of government and enterprises in the ecological environment protection of the Yangtze River Economic Belt in the context of "The sewage charges system was changed to the environmental protection tax system" in environmental protection, the evolutionary game model for ecological environment protection government regulation in the Yangtze River Economic Belt was constructed. It reveals the change of strategy between government and enterprises. Research results show that the cost of government supervision, the increased cost of legal waste discharge by enterprises, the increase in profits from legal waste discharge, and the penalties imposed on enterprises for illegal discharge of pollutants have important influence on the strategic choices of government and enterprises. On this basis, we put forward some countermeasures and suggestions. They are establishing a coordinated protection mechanism for the ecological environment of the Yangtze River Economic Belt, giving full play to the economic leverage adjustment of environmental protection tax, Implementing the strictest ecological environment protection system in the Yangtze River Economic Belt and so on.