开放式创新下合作型研发外包中知识转移的激励研究 ——基于演化博弈模型

Incentive Research on Knowledge Transfer in Cooperative R&D Outsourcing under Open Innovation—Based on Evolutionary Game Model

摘要:

针对开放式创新下合作型研发外包中知识转移行为，考虑到这种类型的研发外包中发包方和接包方的知识转移关系较以往有所不同，论文研究了发包方和接包方的知识转移行为和策略。依据发包方和接包方所采用的不同策略，构建了二者的收益矩阵，并以此建立研发外包中知识转移的演化博弈模型，从中分析得到发包方和接包方知识转移行为的演化稳定策略。结果表明:接包方和发包方的知识转移侧策略选择与二者的收益比例密切相关，当二者的知识转移收益比例的取值范围发生变化时，其演化稳定策略也随之变化。并分析了转移成本、知识投入以及合作研发能力对于演化稳定策略的影响。然后针对在知识转移中发包方或者接包方“搭便车”的行为问题，分析了在加入激励机制情形下所呈现的演化博弈结果。最后利用数值模拟法，验证了模型和结论的有效性。

Abstract:

Considering the knowledge transfer behavior in collaborative R&D outsourcing under open innovation, taking into account the knowledge transfer relationship between the outsourcer and the contractor in this type of R&D outsourcing is different than in the past, the paper studies the knowledge of the contractor and the contractor. Transfer behaviors and strategies. Based on the different strategies adopted by the contractor and the contractor, the revenue matrix of the two is constructed, and the evolutionary game model of knowledge transfer in R&D outsourcing is established. From this analysis, the evolutionary stability of the knowledge transfer behavior of the contractor and the contractor is obtained. Strategy. The results show that the strategic choices of the knowledge transfer side of the contractor and the contractor are closely related to the proportion of the two. When the value range of the knowledge transfer revenue ratio of the two parties changes, the evolutionary stability strategy also changes. It also analyzes the impact of transfer costs, knowledge investment, and cooperative R&D capabilities on evolutionary stabilization strategies. Then for the issue of “free-riding” of the contractor or the contractor in knowledge transfer, the evolutionary game results presented in the context of joining the incentive mechanism are analyzed. Finally, numerical simulation method was used to verify the validity of the model and the conclusion.