高管激励、创新投入与创新绩效——基于高管“双元”资本 的调节效应

Executive Incentives, Innovation Input and Innovation Performance: Based on Executive “Double Dollar” Capital Regulating effect

摘要:

本文通过构建高管激励、创新投入与创新绩效之间的理论模型，并引入高管“双元”资本作调节变量，以2014-2016年1022家A股上市公司为研究对象，运用泊松固定效应模型回归方法对高管激励、创新投入与创新绩效以及高管“双元”资本的调节作用进行检验。结果表明：高管薪酬激励和创新投入均正向影响创新绩效；高管股权激励负向影响创新绩效；高管人力资本在高管激励、创新投入与创新绩效间起不同的调节作用；高管社会资本在高管激励、创新投入与创新绩效间均起负向调节作用。本文研究对于上市公司权衡创新投入与创新绩效的经营决策以及对高管激励机制的设计具有重要参考价值。

Abstract:

This paper establishes a theoretical model between executive incentives, innovation investment and innovation performance, and introduces the“dual”capital of executives as a regulatory variable. Taking the 1022 A-share listed companies in 2014-2016 as the research object, using Poisson fixed The effect model regression method tests the incentive effects of executive incentives, innovation input and innovation performance, and executives''“dual”capital. The results show that executive compensation incentives and innovation inputs are positively affecting innovation performance; executive equity incentives negatively affect innovation performance; executive human capital plays a different role in regulating executive incentives, innovation investment and innovation performance; Social capital plays a negative role in regulating executive incentives, innovation investment and innovation performance. This paper has important reference value for the listed company to weigh the innovation investment and innovation performance of the business decision-making and the design of the executive incentive mechanism.