碳税政策下港口与船舶关于减排决策的博弈分析

Game analysis of port and ship decisions on emission reduction under carbon tax policy

摘要:

近年来,港口环境污染的问题日益严重,作为港口供应链上的核心企业,港口企业和船公司在推动绿色港口的构建上发挥着重要作用。本文考虑到全球碳税政策的背景,同时兼顾客户群体的绿色偏好,分别探讨分析集中、分散两种决策情形下港口企业和船公司的碳减排决策,其中分散决策下主要考虑以下情况：港口企业为主导Stackelberg博弈、港口企业和船公司的Nash博弈、船公司为主导的Stackelberg博弈。探究四种博弈情况下港航企业在碳减排方面的抉择。最后得出在集中决策情形下港航企业以及客户群体可以达到最优目标。其次分析不同参数对于关键变量的影响,结果表明政府对港区征收碳税以及客户群体绿色意识的提高都会促进港口方和船方的减排力度。上述得出的相关性结论能够帮助政府制定合适的碳税条例以及为港口方、船舶方的决策提供了参考意义。

Abstract:

In recent years, the problem of port environmental pollution has become increasingly serious. As a core enterprise in the port supply chain, port companies and shipping companies play an important role in promoting the construction of green ports. Based on the carbon tax policy, this paper considers the low carbon preference of customers and compares the carbon emission reduction decisions of port enterprises and shipping companies under centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making. Among them, the following are mainly considered in the decentralized decision-making: port enterprises dominate the Stackelberg game, The Nash game of port companies and shipping companies, and the shipping company-led Stackelberg game. Compare the choices of both parties in the emission reduction strategy under the four decision scenarios. The results show that enterprises and customer groups can achieve optimal goals under centralized decision-making. Secondly, analyzing the influence of different parameters on key variables, the government"s levy of a certain proportion of carbon tax and the enhancement of the customer"s awareness of low-carbon environmental protection will increase the emission reduction of the port and the ship. These conclusions provide a reference for government departments to formulate appropriate carbon tax rates and decision-making by ports and ships.