针对畜禽规模养殖污染防控动力不足、污染防控长效运行机制缺失等问题,基于有限理性假设,运用演化博弈理论建立养殖户与地方政府间博弈的复制动态方程,得到不同情景下养殖户和地方政府博弈的进化稳定策略及主要影响因素,在模型求解的基础上,利用MATLAB仿真工具分析不同参数变量情景下养殖户与地方政府决策行为的动态调整过程。研究得出：地方政府和养殖户在粪污防控策略执行过程中的动态演化在很大程度上取决于地方政府粪污防控的引导力度、引导成本、奖惩力度和养殖户参与治理力度、成本、收益等因素的大小。基于此,建议地方政府加强引导和宣传培训、建立高效奖惩机制、加快技术创新与服务支持,以期实现畜禽规模养殖污染防控策略优化,提高畜禽粪污综合利用率,促进环境绩效向经济绩效的良性转换,实现双重帕累托改进。

In view of the shortage of livestock and poultry breeding pollution prevention and control power and the lack of long-term operation mechanism, etc, basedSonStheSplayersSwithSboundedSrationality,Sthe paper obtains evolutionary stable strategies and main influencing factors under different circumstances by formulating replicated dynamics equations between farms and the government. And then on the basis of the model solution, the dynamic adjustment process of decision-making behavior between farm and local government under different parameter variables is analyzed by using MATLAB simulation tool. The results show that the dynamic evolution of local government and aquaculture farms in the process of implementing the strategy depends largely on the strength of local government guidance, guidance costs, incentives and penalties, farm participation in management, net income and other factors. Therefore, it is suggested that local governments should strengthen guidance, publicity and training, improve efficient reward and punishment mechanism, and speed up technological innovation and service support while implementing the policy of fecal pollution prevention and control. In order to optimize the pollution prevention and control strategy of livestock and poultry scale breeding, improve the comprehensive utilization rate of livestock and poultry manure, promote the benign transformation of environmental performance to economic performance, and realize the dual Pareto improvement.

国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目）