政策不确定性与企业粗放型创新：激励效应与选择效应

Policy Uncertainty and Enterprise Extensive Innovation ：Incentive Effect and Selective Effect

摘要:

创新驱动政策下,地方政府为“创新”而竞争,企业创新呈粗放式模式,投入力度虽不断增强,但专利成果却量多质低。本文研究发现：(1)受新上任政府为“创新”而竞争的政策激励,政策不确定性对企业粗放型创新投入具有明显的促进作用。(2)政策不确定性对粗放式创新质量的影响存在着选择效应,面临政治冲击时,仅“功利性”的策略性创新企业专利申请数量短期内急剧增加,而以提升创新能力为目的的实质性创新专利数量并未显著增加。(3)在以专利数量等为政府资源分配的重要参考指标驱动下,政府补贴这一政策工具在政策不确定性与粗放型创新之间发挥了传导作用。本文结论意味着专利数据考核指标,政府补贴等“非市场”因素增强了企业粗放型创新行为,但并不利于创新质量的提高。

Abstract:

Under the innovation-driven policy, local governments compete for "innovation". Enterprise innovation is extensive. Although the investment is increasing, the number of patents is large but the quality is low. Research finds that: (1) Inspired by the new government"s industrial policy, policy uncertainty has a significant role in promoting enterprise"s extensive innovation investment.(2) Policy uncertainty has a selective effect on the quality of extensive innovation. In the face of political shocks, the number of patent applications for strategic innovative enterprises with "utilitarianism" has increased sharply in a short period of time, while the number of substantive innovative patents aiming at improving innovation capability has not increased significantly.(3) Driven by the number of patents and other important reference indicators for government resource allocation, government subsidies play a guiding role between policy uncertainty and extensive innovation. The conclusion of this paper means that the "non-market" factors such as patent data assessment indicators and government subsidies enhance the extensive innovation of enterprises, but they are not conducive to the improvement of innovation quality.