基于演化博弈的高新技术企业创新风险防控研究

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Innovation Risk Prevention and Control of High-tech Enterprises in China

摘要:

面对高新技术企业融资难与“圈钱”争议的困局,通过适当的制度设计与政策支持,引导创新资金的高效配置,实现创新风险的有效防控已成为实施“创新驱动”发展战略的重要保障。本文构建了一个包括政府监管部门、投资者与高新技术企业的三方行为策略演化博弈模型,探讨了三方行为策略的影响因素及演化路径。研究发现：(1)当投资者的信息甄别成本小于投资收益且投资额度小于政府监管部门的惩罚时,本文的演化稳定策略是政府监管部门实施“严格监管”策略,投资者实施“参与投资”策略,高新技术企业执行“自律”策略；(2)当政府监管部门采取“严格监管”措施时,惩罚力度越大,高新技术企业越倾向于选择“自律”的行为策略；(3)随着投资者投资额度的增加,高新技术企业选择“自律”行为策略的概率逐渐降低。

Abstract:

In the face of the dilemma of financing difficulty and the controversy of "raise money by hook" in high-tech enterprises, it has become an important guarantee to implement the "innovation-driven" development strategy to guide the efficient allocation of innovative funds and realize the effective prevention and control of innovative risks through appropriate system design and policy support. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model of tripartite behavior strategy, which includes government regulatory authorities, investors and high-tech enterprises, and explores the influencing factors and evolutionary path of major stakeholders. The results show that: (1) when the cost of investor information screening is less than the investment return and the investment amount is less than the punishment of the government supervision department, the evolutionarily stable strategy of this paper is that the government supervision department implements the "strict supervision" strategy, the investors implement the "participation in investment" strategy, and the high-tech enterprises implement the "self-discipline" strategy; (2) when the government supervision department adopts the "strict supervision" strategy, the greater the punishment being imposed, the more likely the high-tech enterprises are to choose the "self-discipline" behavior strategy; (3) with the increase of investors" investment quota, the probability of the high-tech enterprises choosing the "self-discipline" behavior strategy gradually decreases.