碳限额交易及补贴机制下的供应链定价与协调

Supply Chain Pricing and Coordination under Cap-and-Trade System and Subsidy Mechanism

摘要:

基于制造商和零售商的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了分散决策和集中决策下碳限额额度和补贴对供应链定价减排决策的影响。结果表明：无论是分散决策还是集中决策,对于清洁型制造商,碳限额额度的提高会使制造商最优碳排放量增加；对于污染型制造商,随着碳限额额度的提高,制造商最优碳排放量呈现先降低后增加的趋势；碳限额过高时,政府补贴越高,产品的定价越高；集中决策下制造商单位最优碳排放量优于分散决策下,因此引进两部定价契约对供应链进行协调,发现在两部定价契约中,批发价随碳限额和补贴的增加而降低,但固定支付随碳限额和补贴的增加而增加。

Abstract:

Based on the Stackelberg game model of manufacturers and retailers, the paper discusses the impact of carbon credits and subsidies on supply chain pricing and emission reduction decisions under decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making. The results show that for decentralized decision-making or centralized decision-making, for clean manufacturers, the increase in carbon limit will increase the optimal carbon emissions of manufacturers; for polluting manufacturers, with the increase of carbon limit, manufacturers are the most The carbon emission is lower first and then increased. When the carbon limit is too high, the higher the government subsidy, the higher the product price; the optimal carbon emission of the manufacturer under the centralized decision is better than the decentralized decision, so the two are introduced. The pricing contract coordinated the supply chain and found that in the two pricing contracts, the wholesale price decreased with the increase of carbon limit and subsidy, but the fixed payment increased with the increase of carbon limit and subsidy.