区块链信息服务监管的博弈仿真分析

Game Simulation Analysis ofBlock Chain Information Service Supervision

摘要:

分析区块链信息服务监管中参与主体的决策行为,有助于寻找区块链创新与监管间的平衡点。基于有限理性演化博弈理论,建立区块链信息服务监管三方演化博弈模型；通过对政府部门、信息服务提供者与使用者博弈策略演化稳定性的分析,并置入计算实验方法“情景——应对”思想进行数值模拟与仿真计算。实验结果表明,在政府部门严格监管情景下,通过“命令——控制”机制以规避信息服务违规风险,往往会因为程度难以把控而阻碍区块链创新发展,而建立信息服务供求双方“损失——赔偿”动态调试性监管规制,能提升信息服务的使用效率。

Abstract:

The analysis of the decision-making behavior of participants in the supervision of block chain information service helps to find the balance between block chain innovation and supervision. Based on the evolutionary game theory of finite rationality, a tripartite evolutionary game model of block chain information service supervision is established. By analyzing the evolutionary stability of game strategies of government departments, information service providers and users, and incorporating the idea of “scenario-response” into the calculation experiment method, numerical simulation and simulation calculation are carried out. Experimental results show that in government regulation scenario, through “command – control” mechanism to avoid the risk of illegal information service, often because of difficult to control and hinder block chain innovation and development, and establish the information service of supply and demand both sides “losses – compensation” dynamic debugging supervision regulation, can improve the use efficiency of the information service.