政府应如何补贴委托代理关系下的产学合作

How the government subsidizes industry-university collaborationinnovation under principal-agent relationships

摘要:

产出分享模式作为现实中主要的利润分配模式，可以对代理方产生一定的激励效果。但是想要更多的激励只能借助于外部力量，比如政府补贴。本文在委托代理理论的基础上，使用连续型生产函数，提出了按成本补贴的补贴方式，并且定量地给出了补贴的力度。我们发现在这样的补贴方式下，代理方可以按照合作总利润最大的目标去努力。并且随着补贴力度的增加，合作总利润将呈现出3个阶段：加速增长阶段、减速增长阶段和负增长阶段，较少的补贴刺激利润增加，较多的补贴反而使利润减少而且更有可能导致道德风险发生。此外，我们发现政府补贴可以发掘合作创新中的协同性，在补贴直接激励代理方的同时代理方的额外努力也激励了委托方，从而进一步提升合作的总利润。

关键词:双边激励;双边道德风险;产出分享;定量补贴;委托代理;协同创新

Abstract:

The profit sharing mode is the main incentive mechanism used during the process of industry-university collaboration innovation under principal-agent relationships. The agent can be encouraged but rather limited, depending on the external force (e.g. the government subsidy) may be the only way to get additional encouragement. Based on the principal-agent theory, we use continuous Cobb-Douglas production function, we find the subsidy mode of subsidy to the agent according to the cost, which can stimulate the agent more effectively and give the quantity of subsidy quantitatively. Under this method, the effort which the agent wants to make is just the effort the maximum collaboration profits wanted. When the subsidy increases, the trend of the collaboration profits appears to be three stages: accelerated growth stage, decelerated growth stage and negative growth stage. Fewer subsidies lead to higher acceleration of profits, while more subsidies lead to lower acceleration of profits and higher probability of moral hazard. Synergistic effect is found when subsidy exists, although the subsidy is given to the agent. The principle is also encouraged, which makes the collaboration profits higher.

Key words:double-sided incentives; double-sided moral hazard; profit sharing mode; quantitative subsidy; principal-agent theory; industry-university collaboration