Nash谈判博弈情境异质性对三高创业绩效的影响机理

Research on the influence mechanism of Nash negotiation game situation heterogeneity on three-high entrepreneurial performance

摘要:

大量实践显示高层次、高素质、高技能（三高）人才创业企业与科技孵化投资机构的合作对于前者成长具有重要作用,但是信息不对称产生的道德风险会破坏双方合作关系。深层次剖析双边道德风险条件下创业合作决策对合作关系的影响作用机理，构建创业合作的一般性纳什谈判博弈，设计服务协议约束下双方合作的中庸策略，基于促成合作的思想，对双边道德风险条件下的4种创业合作情境的异质性均衡进行比较分析，揭示谈判博弈情境对三高创业者博弈收益的作用机理。实证研究发现：中庸或聚点策略对创业合作绩效及公正性都具有显著的负向影响，收益转移互助模式相比非合作预案模式，对创业合作绩效具有更为关键的正向推动作用。基于此，分别从谈判、博弈规则、信息与资源管理等方面提出了最优化创业合作建议，以有效抑制双边道德风险，真正消除创业过程中的漠然状态，最大限度地促进创业合作关系，提升创业合作绩效，加快创业企业成长，更好地实现三高人才创业企业的长期可持续性发展目标。理论层面上，该研究结论铺垫并夯实了双边道德风险条件下创业合作关系的基础，丰富了创业组织间合作关系理论和不同谈判情境下的创业合作收益分配模型；实践层面上，为当代我国三高人才创业企业良性成长及合作管制给出科学指引、经验依据和策略建议。

Abstract:

Based on a lot of practice, cooperation of high-level, high-quality, or high-skilled talents’ start-up, business incubation and venture capital institution plays an important role in growth of China's entrepreneurial enterprises. However, the moral hazard caused by information asymmetry will damage the partnership. The paper dissects the influence mechanism of entrepreneurial cooperative decision on cooperative relationship deeply under the condition of bilateral moral hazard, constructs general Nash negotiation game for incubation and venture capital services, and designs moderative strategy under the constraint of service agreement. Based on the cooperative thought, the paper makes a comparative analysis of the four heterogeneity equilibriums of entrepreneurial cooperation under the condition of bilateral moral risk, and discovers the influence mechanism of Nash negotiation game situation heterogeneity on three-high entrepreneurial performance. The empirical results show that the moderative or focal point strategy have significant negative influence on the cooperation performance and the fairness of the cooperative community. Compared with non-cooperation predetermined precept under disciplinal measures, income transfer model is more incentive and has a more critically positive role in promoting entrepreneurial cooperation income. Based on this, this paper puts forward the optimal entrepreneurial cooperation decision suggestions from the aspects of negotiation, game rules, information and resource management, etc, in order to effectively curb bilateral moral risks, eliminate the indifference indeed in the entrepreneurial process, promote entrepreneurial partnership furthest, improve the performance of entrepreneurial cooperation, accelerate the growth of entrepreneurial enterprises, and realize the long-term sustainable development goals of three-high talent’s start-ups betterly. Theoretically, the conclusions establish the entrepreneurial cooperative relationship basics under the condition of bilateral moral hazard, and enrich the partnership theory of entrepreneurial organizations and profit distribution model of entrepreneurial cooperation under various negotiation situation. At a practical level, research conclusions can provide scientific guidelines, empirical evidence and strategic advice for optimum growth and cooperation control of our contemporary three-high talent’ start-ups.