中国制造业功能升级演化博弈分析 ——基于俘获型全球价值链治理视角

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Manufacturing Function Upgrade in China: Based on the Perspective of Capture Global Value Chain Governance

摘要:

基于演化博弈理论构建中国制造业企业与发达国家领导企业的动态复制系统，运用MATLAB数值仿真分析方法探究中国制造业企业功能升级的动态演化路径以及影响双方策略选择的因素。研究发现：中国制造业企业动态复制系统中有3个演化稳定策略，最终趋于哪种稳定策略依赖于收益矩阵及参数变化，企业功能升级后额外收益的提高以及为实现功能升级需要付出的额外成本的降低，都会增加企业进行功能升级的可能。为此，提出中国制造业企业应通过构建国内价值链、减少与领导企业直接竞争并加大与领导企业的合作力度来提高功能升级、降低领导企业造成的阻碍。

Abstract:

Based on the theory of evolutionary game, this paper constructs a dynamic replication system of Chinese manufacturing enterprises and leading enterprises in developed countries, uses MATLAB numerical simulation analysis method to explore the dynamic evolution path of functional upgrading of Chinese manufacturing enterprises and factors affecting strategy selection of both parties. It is found that there are three evolutional stabilization strategies in the dynamic replication system of Chinese manufacturing enterprises, and which stabilization strategy eventually tends to depend on the income matrix and parameter changes, the increase of income after the enterprise function upgrade and the decrease of extra cost to realize the function upgrade will increase the possibility of the enterprise to carry on function upgrade. To this end, the paper proposes that Chinese manufacturing enterprises should improve the function upgrade and reduce the obstacles caused by leading enterprises by constructing domestic value chain, reducing direct competition with leading enterprises and increasing cooperation with leading enterprises.