“双一流”视角下高校与高层次人才流动博弈研究

Research on the Flow Game between University and High-level Talents from the Perspective of

摘要:

“双一流”战略是中国高等教育发展史上一个里程碑式的战略举措。该战略提出后，中国高校亟需高层次人才加强自身学科建设。在此背景下，高校高层次人才引进和流动日益频繁，这也为高校与高层次人才流动博弈提供了条件。本文创新点是根据理性人假设，从混合策略纳什均衡博弈和委托-代理博弈角度出发，多维度分析了高校与高层次人才之间的流动博弈。博弈研究发现高校与高层次人才博弈存在博弈均衡解问题，高层次人才流动还与薪酬奖励、城市发展、家庭幸福和科研平台有直接关系。本文立足我国高校发展现状并结合博弈研究结果提出了相应的政策建议。

Abstract:

The “double first-class” strategy is a milestone strategic move in the history of China's higher education development. After the strategy is put forward, Chinese universities urgently need high-level talents to strengthen their own discipline construction. In this context, the introduction and flow of high-level talents in colleges and universities has become increasingly frequent, which also provides conditions for the flow of college and high-level talents. According to the hypothesis of rational people, this paper analyzes the flow game between colleges and high-level talents from the perspective of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium game and principal-agent game. Game research found that there is a game equilibrium problem between universities and high-level talents. The high-level talent flow is also directly related to salary reward, urban development, family happiness and scientific research platform. Based on the current situation of the development of Chinese universities and the results of the game research, this paper puts forward corresponding policy recommendations.