地方政府竞争、环境分权与环境污染--基于两步系统GMM与广义分位数的检验

Local Government Competition, Environmental Decentralization and Environmental Pollution--Testing Based on GMM and Generalized Quantile of Two-Step System

摘要:

随着中国经济发展水平的不断提高,环境分权对环境污染的影响有了新的变化,且这些变化多与地方政府竞争有关,因此本文利用2005-2016年省际面板数据,通过两步SYS-GMM和广义分位数对环境分权和地方政府竞争对环境污染的影响进行实证分析。结果发现：(1) 整体上环境分权、地方政府竞争与环境污染存在显著的正相关性,即环境分权体制下,地方政府竞争对环境的负面效应明显；(2)从不同的分位区间来看,地方政府竞争和环境分权对环境污染的冲击呈现出“促进低污染,抑制高污染”的倒“V”型特征；(3)地方政府竞争和环境分权对环境污染的影响在“东-中-西”空间分布上表现出抑制到促进的阶梯型转变。因此“央-地”政府应当利用现中国经济转型的战略机遇,进一步深化环境分权制度和地方政府竞争激励机制的改革,协调政府行为和环境之间的关系,为中国环境事业添砖加瓦。

Abstract:

With the continuous improvement of China"s economic development level, the impact of environmental decentralization on environmental pollution has undergone new changes, and these changes are mostly related to local government competition. Therefore, this paper uses the provincial panel data from 2005 to 2016 to analyze the impact of environmental decentralization and local government competition on environmental pollution through two-step SYS-GMM and generalized quantile. Empirical analysis is conducted. The results show that: (1) on the whole, there is a significant positive correlation between environmental decentralization, local government competition and environmental pollution, that is, under the environmental decentralization system, the negative effect of local government competition on the environment is obvious; (2) from the perspective of different sub-regions, the impact of local government competition and environmental decentralization on environmental pollution presents.“ The inverted "V" characteristics of promoting low pollution and restraining high pollution; (3) The impact of local government competition and environmental decentralization on environmental pollution shows a ladder-like transformation from restraint to promotion in the spatial distribution of "East-Central-West". Therefore, the "central-local" government should take advantage of the strategic opportunity of China"s economic transformation, further deepen the reform of environmental decentralization system and local government competition incentive mechanism, coordinate the relationship between government behavior and environment, and contribute to China"s environmental cause.