工业电子商务电商平台与经营者合规运营演化博弈分析

TAI Deyi1,2, Pan Hailan1,2

摘要:

政府既要鼓励工业电子商务发展，又要监管工业电子商务的合规运营。针对工业电子商务系统中电商平台与经营者合规运营问题，构建非对称演化博弈模型，研究政府监管政策的影响力与执行力对电商平台与经营者运营策略选择的影响。结果表明：政府不监管，电商平台与经营者最终会选择违规运营；政府监管对于电商平台与经营者的合规运营策略选择具有双重影响，合理的监管政策可以有效约束电商平台与经营者的合规运营行为；执行力较低的监管政策，会刺激电商平台与经营者采取违规运营策略。推动工业电子商务在我国的健康、快速发展，政府不仅要出台激励政策，更要出台合理的监管政策。

Abstract:

The government should not only encourage the development of industrial e-commerce， but also supervise the proper operation of the partners in industrial e-commerce system. An asymmetric evolutionary game model was constructed to study the influence of government regulation on the game of improper operation between industrial e-commerce platforms and industrial enterprises residing in the platform. The results show that industrial e-commerce platforms and operators will eventually choose improper operation strategy without government supervision, government regulation has a double-sided impact on the choice of operation strategies of industrial e-commerce platforms and industrial enterprises. Reasonable regulation can effectively restrain the proper behaviors of industrial enterprises, and promote the industrial e-commerce platforms adherence to operation according to the rules. The low enforceability of the regulation will not only hinder the enthusiasm of the platform in compliance operation, but also stimulate operators to take non-compliant operation behavior. Therefore，the government should not only introduce incentive policies，but also introduce reasonable regulations with influence and enforceability to promote the healthy and rapid development of industrial e-commerce in China.