考虑农产品绿色度的农业生产经营主体治污策略选择研究

Research on Pollution Control Strategy Selection of Agricultural Production and Management Subjects Considering Greenness of Agricultural Products

摘要:

在消费者具有绿色选择偏好和政府提供绿色补贴情况下，考虑农产品绿色度对农业生产经营效益的影响，建立农业生产经营主体在非合作与合作情形下的农业面源污染治理微分博弈模型，基于HJB方程求得博弈均衡解。研究发现：无论是非合作还是协同合作情形，消费者的绿色偏好和政府的绿色补贴越高，主体产生的污染量越少、治污努力程度越高；政府补贴激励作用在非合作情形下失效，但在合作情形时效果显著；从非合作情形到合作情形，当政府补贴系数一定时，农业生产经营主体的治污努力及个体收益和总收益、农产品绿色度均实现了帕累托改进

Abstract:

When consumers have a preference for green choices and the government provides green subsidies, this paper considers the impact of the greenness of agricultural products on the profitability of agricultural production and operation, and establishes a differential game model of agricultural non-point source pollution control under the non-cooperation and cooperation situation. The game equilibrium solution is obtained based on HJB equation. It is found that the higher the consumers' green preference and the government's green subsidies, the less the amount of pollution generated by subjects, and the higher the level of pollution control efforts they make, whether in non-cooperative or cooperative situations; the incentive effect of government subsidies fails in non-cooperative situations, but the effect is significant in cooperative situations; from the non-cooperative situation to the cooperative situation, when the government subsidy coefficient is fixed, the pollution control efforts of the agricultural production and operation subjects, individual income, total income, and the greenness of agricultural products have all achieved Pareto improvement