高管过度自信对企业创新模式选择的影响——兼论独立董事和非沉淀性冗余资源的调节作用

Executive Overconfidence and Enterprise’s Selection of Innovation Model—— The Moderating Effect of Independent Directors and Unabsorbed Slack Resources

摘要:

现有研究表明,高管过度自信有利于企业创新,但是这种有利的关系对于二元创新的影响并不是相同的。本研究通过文本分析和多元回归研究了293家公司,探讨了高管过度自信与企业创新模式选择之间的关系,并在此基础上探讨了独立董事和非沉淀性冗余资源的调节作用。结果发现,高管过度自信与创新模式选择显著相关,高管过度自信越高,企业在创新模式选择上越偏好探索型创新；高管过度自信越低,企业在创新模式选择上越偏好应用型创新。独立董事和非沉淀性冗余资源负向调节高管过度自信与企业创新模式选择的关系。

Abstract:

The existing research shows that executive overconfidence is conducive to enterprise innovation, but the influence on ambidextrous innovation is not the same. By studying 293 enterprises through text analysis and multiple regression, we analysed the relationship between executive overconfidence and selection of innovation model. Based on that, we also discussed the moderating effect of independent directors and unabsorbed slack resources. The results show that executive overconfidence is significantly related to the enterprise’s selection of innovation model. The higher the degree of executive overconfidence, the more the enterprise prefers exploration; the lower the degree of executive overconfidence, the more the enterprise prefers exploitation. Independent directors and unabsorbed slack resources negatively regulate the relationship between executive overconfidence and enterprise’s innovation model.