创新效率视角下SEP拒绝许可行为的反垄断法责任分析 ——以FTC诉高通案为切入

Analysis of the Anti-monopoly Law Responsibility of SEP Rejecting Licensing from the Perspective of Innovation Efficiency ——from the perspective of FTC v. Qualcomm

摘要:

反垄断法对企业拒绝许可知识产权行为的规制需要平衡创新效率与竞争效率。对标准必要专利权人拒绝许可行为合法性的考察需要比较标准化活动对于创新效率的增加与其对于市场竞争效率的减损。从全产业链的角度看待标准化活动，标准化虽然降低了上游技术市场的竞争，却提升了设备之间的兼容性，增加了下游标准化产品市场的产量及竞争活动。由于司法机构无法对这两个变量进行精确测算，根据General Data案，Aspen Skiing案不能适用于高通公司拒绝许可标准必要专利的情形中。高通公司作为芯片研发市场的上游企业，拒绝将芯片生产技术许可给竞争性芯片生产商的行为并未对下游手机生产市场的竞争状况造成损害，强行在芯片制造环节引入竞争并不会对下游手机产品市场带来利益，反而影响上游芯片研发市场的创新效率。

Abstract:

It is necessary for Anti-monopoly law to balance innovation efficiency and competition efficiency when regulates intellectual property refusal activities. The examination of the legality of the standard essential patentee's refusal needs to weigh the innovation efficiency and the impairment of the market competition efficiency brought by the standardization activities. From the perspective of the entire industry chain. Standardization has improved the compatibility between equipment and increased the production and competition activities of the downstream standardized product market. Due to the inability to accurately measure these two variables in judicial practice, Aspen Skiing cannot be applied in the case of Qualcomm's refusal to license the necessary patents under General Data. As an upstream company in the chip R&D market, Qualcomm's refusal to license chip production technology to competitive chip manufacturers has not caused damage to the competition in the downstream mobile phone production market. Forcing the introduction of competition in the chip manufacturing sector will not bring benefits to the downstream market of mobile phones, which in turn affects the innovation efficiency of the upstream chip R&D market.