探讨员工知识隐藏的策略选择问题，以前景理论价值函数取代传统支付矩阵中不确定的损益值，构建博弈模型进行分析。研究结果表明：（1）当同时满足以下两个条件时，员工双方都可以达到知识共享这一最优演化状态：一是员工双方都选择知识共享状态时的获得感大于单个员工选择知识共享状态时的获得感，二是知识被共享者对知识共享者的回报大于其付出的成本；（2）若上述任意一个条件不成立，需要额外的附加条件方可达到最优演化状态，可通过采取使得感知差值小于回馈与成本差值这一措施予以解决。

This paper discusses the strategy selection of employee knowledge hiding, replaces the uncertain profit and loss value in the traditional payment matrix with the foreground theoretical value function, and constructs a game model for analysis. The results show that: (1) The optimal evolution of knowledge sharing can be achieved by both employees when the following two conditions are met: first, the sense of acquisition when both employees choose the state of knowledge sharing is greater than that of a single employee when they choose the state of knowledge sharing, second, the return of knowledge-sharers to knowledge-sharers is greater than their cost; (2) If any of the above conditions do not hold, additional conditions are needed to achieve the optimal evolution state, which can be solved by making the perceptual difference less than the difference between feedback and cost.

G311；G301

国家自然科学基金项目“多虚拟社区环境下员工工作激情演化的突变及控制机制”（72001121）；山东省教研教改项目“学分制背景下管理科学与工程类专业学科大类平台课体系优化与教学内容改革”（Z2018X074）