“二对一”结构供应链中研发型制造商的 技术授权策略研究

Research on technology authorization strategy of the R&D manufacturer in a supply chain with “two-to-one” structure

摘要:

在由两个制造商（一个是研发型制造商，另一个是非研发型制造商）和一个零售商构成的“二对一”结构的供应链中，考虑横向技术溢出效应，构建了技术不授权和技术授权（包括单位产量授权和固定费用授权）模型，给出了研发型制造商最优的技术授权策略，分析了技术溢出程度和产品替代性对模型结果的影响。研究表明：（1）研发型制造商的最优技术授权策略和最优授权值主要取决于产品替代性和技术溢出程度。（2）在单位产量授权（固定费用授权）策略下，零售商的利润总是小于（大于）技术不授权策略下。（3）当产品替代性较小（较大）时，单位产量授权策略下的供应链利润总是大于（小于）技术不授权策略下；无论产品替代性如何，固定费用授权策略下的供应链利润总是大于技术不授权策略下。

Abstract:

In a “two-to-one” supply chain consisting of two manufacturers (one is a R&D manufacturer and the other is a non-R&D manufacturer) and a retailer, by considering horizontal technology spillover effects, a model of technology non-authorization and technology authorization (including royalty authorization and fixed fee authorization) models were constructed, then the R&D manufacturer’s optimal technology authorization strategy was given. Finally, the influence of the degree of technology spillover and product substitution on the model results were analyzed. The research shows that: (1) the optimal technology authorization strategy and the optimal authorization value of the R&D manufacturer mainly depend on the degree of product substitution and technology spillover; (2) under the royalty authorization (fixed fee authorization) strategy, the retailer's profit is always less (greater) than that under the technology non-authorization strategy; (3) when the degree of product substitution is small (large), the supply chain’s profit under the royalty authorization strategy is always greater (less) than that under the technology non-authorization strategy. Regardless of the degree of product substitution, the profit of the supply chain under the fixed fee authorization strategy is always greater than that under the technology non-authorization strategy.