双重低碳营销补贴下供应链低碳策略的演化博弈

Evolutionary Game of low-carbon investment in supply chain under the dual subsidy to low-carbon marketing

摘要:

在政府给予制造商、零售商，制造商给予零售商的双重低碳营销补贴的背景下，考虑由上游制造商与下游零售商组成的二级供应链，研究供应链的减排活动及低碳营销问题，建立上下游企业以推动低碳产品流动为目标的低碳投入演化博弈模型，探讨上下游企业低碳投入行为的演化稳定策略。结果表明：制造商与零售商的低碳策略与双方低碳投入收益比和政府补贴密切相关，当低碳投入收益比和政府补贴不断变化时，出现多种演化稳定均衡。针对低碳投入中零售商的“搭便车”行为问题，分析了制造商低碳营销补贴机制下的演化博弈结果，并探讨补贴激励的适用条件。

Abstract:

In the context of the dual subsidy to low-carbon marketing, a two-echelon supply chain consisting of manufacturers and retailers is considered to research on the emission reduction and low-carbon marketing problem. This paper develops an evolutionary game model，and proposes evolutionary stable strategies of investments in promoting low-carbon product flow for upstream and downstream firms. The results show that investment strategies of manufacturers and retailers are related to the ratio of input-output and government subsidy, When the input-output ratios and government subsidy of both parties in supply chains change，some evolutionarily stable equilibrium is found. If manufacturers provide an appropriate low-carbon marketing subsidy, retailers will not become “free riders”.