“休眠态”科技成果“激活”的公共资本补偿博弈研究

Public Capital Compensation Game for ‘Activation’ of ‘Dormant’ S&T Achievements

摘要:

科技成果转化是技术创新的经济价值体现,能够有效地促进产业结构调整,但是,现阶段我国科技成果转化率相对较低,大量成果趋于“休眠”。因此,有必要聚焦到“休眠态”科技成果的价值利用上来,通过构建有效的公共资本补偿机制,打通转化“断裂带”,寻找“激活”路径。由于信息不对称和专业性不足,公共资本在补偿私人转化资本的过程中,需要引入第三方机构进行信息获取和评估。考虑受偿方与评估方存在寻租倾向。基于补偿过程中各主体的行为关系,构建演化博弈模型,通过均衡分析,确定主体的行为策略选择倾向,揭示补偿博弈的内在机理。并在此基础上,提出相应的对策建议,以期在一定程度上提升政府效用。

Abstract:

The commercialization of S T achievements is the economic value of technological innovation, which can effectively promote the adjustment of industrial structure. However, at this stage, the commercialization rate of S T achievements in China is relatively low, and a large number of achievements tend to be ‘dormant’. It is necessary to focus on the utilization of ‘dormant’ S T achievements, through the effective public capital compensation mechanism, to cross the ‘faultlines’ and realize ‘activation’. In the process of compensation for private capital by public capital, due to information asymmetry and lack of professionalism, it needs to introduce more specialized third party institutions for information acquisition and evaluation. Considering the moral hazard, the compensated party and the evaluators have a tendency to seek rent-seeking. Based on the behavior relationship in compensation game, the evolutionary game model is constructed. Through evolutionary equilibrium analysis, the main behavioral strategies of the game players are determined and the internal mechanism of compensation game is revealed. On this basis, it puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions so as to enhance the effectiveness of the government to a certain extent.