顶层治理影响重大工程项目绩效的理论模型——基于代理理论和管家理论融合视角

Research on the Theoretical Model of Top-level Governance Influencing Megaproject Performance: from the Perspective of Agency and Stewardship Theory

摘要:

重大工程对政治、经济和社会的深刻影响与其项目绩效普遍低下的“悖论”成为全球范围内高度重视的治理难题。以经济学、社会学、组织行为学等交叉学科理论为基础，尤其从代理理论和管家理论融合视角，提出应构建动态的、激励与约束相容的重大工程顶层治理机制，分析了其对重大工程项目绩效的直接影响作用；引入组织情境与心理状态两个中介变量，讨论了组织情境与心理状态对顶层治理机制和重大工程过程绩效之间影响关系的中介效应；在此基础上，提出了相关研究假设和理论模型框架，为重大工程项目绩效治理提供新视角和新思路，并对重大工程组织行为及治理的理论研究和实践探索提供借鉴。

Abstract:

The "paradox" of the profound influence of megaproject on politics, economy and society and the generally low project performance has become a global governance problem. Based on the interdisciplinary theories of economics, sociology and organizational behavior, especially from the perspective of the integration of agency theory and stewardship theory, this paper proposes to construct a dynamic top-level governance mechanism of major projects that is compatible with incentives and constraints, and analyzes its direct impact on the performance of major projects. Two mediating variables, organizational situation and psychological state, are introduced to discuss the mediating effect of organizational situation and psychological state on the relationship between top-level governance mechanism and major process performance. On this basis, the relevant research hypothesis and theoretical model framework are put forward to lay a foundation for empirical research. It is expected to provide a new perspective and an new idea for performance governance of megaproject, and provide a reference for theoretical research and practical exploration of organizational behavior and governance of megaproject.