政府研发补贴的激励效应存在门槛吗？——基于融资结构视角的实证研究

R&D Subsidies, Financing Structure and Enterprises’ R&D Investment: An Empirical Research Based on Threshold Effect Model of Panel Data

摘要:

以2014-2018年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,建立面板数据门槛效应模型,从融资结构视角分析政府研发补贴与企业研发投入的非线性关系。研究结果表明：政府研发补贴对企业研发投入具有激励效应,但该激励效应存在融资结构门槛,其中债权融资率和股权融资率的门槛值分别为40.08%和21.80%。只有当企业的债权融资率低于门槛值、股权融资率高于门槛值时,政府研发补贴才能有效提高企业研发投入。因此,我国政府制定研发补贴政策时应考虑融资结构门槛,优化研发补贴的资源配置效果。

Abstract:

Using panel data of listed companies in China from 2014-2018 as research sample, this paper established a panel data threshold effect model to identify the nonlinear relationship between government R D subsidies and enterprises’ innovation from the perspective of financing structure. The results show that government R D subsidies exert an incentive effect on enterprises’ innovation activities, however, their incentive effects have financing structure thresholds. The thresholds for debt financing and equity financing are respectively 40.08% and 21.80%. Only when the debt financing rate is lower than the threshold value and the equity financing rate is higher than the threshold value can government R D subsidies effectively increase enterprises’ innovation. Therefore, government should consider the threshold of financing structure when optimizing the research and development subsidy policy to optimize the resource allocation effect of R D subsidies.