基于关系契约的合同能源管理激励机制研究

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Energy Performance Contracting Based on Relationship Contract

摘要:

合同能源管理(Energy Performance Contracting，简称EPC)作为一种建筑节能的模式，在提高能效水平，缓解能源压力方面效果显著。但由于合同能源管理模式引入我国的时间较短，在实际的应用中存在着许多的问题。针对目前正式契约不能有效激励EPC合作主体共同努力的问题，借助委托代理理论，分析两种不用契约关系下双方的合作关系，探讨关系契约的激励作用。研究表明，在正式契约下节能项目的系统收益并不能达到最优，引入关系契约之后，通过具有“自我实施”性的承诺可以使双方共同努力，从而使节能项目的系统收益达到最优。

Abstract:

Energy Performance Contracting (EPC), as a model of building energy conservation, has significant effects in improving energy efficiency and alleviating energy pressure. However, because the Energy Performance Contracting has been introduced into our country for a short time, there are many problems in practical applications. Aiming at the problem that the current formal contract cannot effectively motivate the EPC partners to work together, with the help of principal-agent theory, we analyze the two parties' cooperative relationship under the non-contractual relationship and explore the incentive effect of the relationship contract. Studies have shown that the system benefits of energy-saving projects cannot be optimal under formal contracts. After the introduction of the relationship contract, the two parties can work together through "self-implementation" commitments to optimize the system benefits of energy-saving projects.