考虑关税和补贴的跨国生产业务外包决策与优化

Game and optimization of transnational production outsourcing considering tariff and subsidy

摘要:

在随机需求下研究了由一个境外集成制造商、一个国际运输服务提供商和一个境外离岸外包商构成的跨国生产业务外包决策问题。定量分析了制造成本、运输成本、关税成本和出口补贴对跨国生产业务外包决策的影响。依次建立了三级独立主从决策模型和联盟主从决策模型,分析了收益分享和成本分担对决策的影响。研究结果表明,当关税成本计算考虑运输费用和保险费用时,跨国供应链难以实现协调。关税税率的提升会使得跨国供应链各方的利润和整体利润减少,会削弱供应商在跨国供应链中的领导地位。出口补贴会增加跨国供应链各方利润及整体利润,可以加强供应商在跨国供应链中的地位。进行收益分享可以改善跨国供应链绩效,但仅仅进行关税成本的分担或者运输成本的分担不但不能改善整个跨国供应链绩效,反而会恶化跨国供应链绩效。

Abstract:

Based on the stochastic demand, this paper studies the outsourcing decision-making problem of global production supply chain, which is composed of an overseas integrated manufacturer, an international transportation service provider and a local parts supplier. The influences of manufacturing cost, transportation cost, and tariff cost and export subsidy on the decision-making of global production are analyzed quantitatively. The independent master-slave decision-making model and alliance master-slave decision-making model are established successively, and the impact of income analysis and cost sharing on decision-making is analyzed. The research shows that the increase of the cost of any link in the global supply chain will lead to the decrease of the order quantity of overseas integrated manufacturers. Alliance game can improve the performance of global supply chain. The increase of tariff rate will reduce the profits of all parties and the overall profits of the global supply chain, and weaken the leading position of suppliers in the global supply chain. Export subsidies will increase the profits of all parties and the overall profits of the global supply chain, and strengthen the position of suppliers in the global supply chain. Revenue sharing can improve the performance of the global supply chain. However, only tariff cost sharing or transportation cost sharing cannot improve the performance of the whole global supply chain, but will worsen the performance of the global supply chain.