[关键词]
[摘要]
新旧两种技术的管理与运营是企业普遍面临的决策问题,研究具有主体引导与惩罚约束性的政策,在市场资源配置效率低时具有重要意义。针对以双积分形式衡量传统能源与新能源汽车技术性能的产业政策,基于技术运营和研发子模块的因果回路分析构建了系统动力学模型。多情景仿真结果表明,技术研发是降低燃料消耗量实际值、提高新能源汽车续航里程,从而实现积分负值转正的关键,外部市场需求通过影响研发资金投入,内部的学习曲线效应通过直接作用研发过程,影响政策施行效果和作用周期。另一方面,政府对燃料消耗量达标值等关键指标的调控,决定着通过市场机制购买正积分的难度和成本,与市场需求因素共同影响企业的适应性决策。建议此类政策设定阶梯式趋严的技术指标,在初期施加压力的同时刺激技术研发,企业在政策缓冲期内应避免完全市场导向的运营,通过提升技术的指标效率,为政策趋严时的产能产量调整提供空间。
[Key word]
[Abstract]
The management and operation of the old and new technologies is a decision-making problem commonly faced by enterprises. It’s of great significance to study the policy with characteristics of subjective guidance and punishment when the efficiency of market resource allocation is low. To industrial policy which measures technical performance of fuel and new energy vehicles in the form of double points, this paper analyzes the causal loop relationships in two sub modules of technology operation and R&D, and then establishes a system dynamics model. Simulation results of multiple scenarios show that, by reducing fuel consumption or raising mileage of new energy vehicles, R&D is the key to make integral positive from negative. External market demand influences R&D capital input, while learning curve affects R&D process directly. These two factors affect implementation effect and duration of industrial policies. On the other hand, the difficulty and cost of purchasing positive points through market are determined by the regulation of policies on key indicators, such as the standard value of fuel consumption. The policy will affect adaptive decision-making of enterprises, jointly with the demand factor. It is suggested to design policy with staircase tighter technical indicators, while policy pressure is applied to stimulate R&D at initial stage. Enterprises should avoid absolute market oriented operation and improve technology efficiency actively during the policy buffer period. The strategy will provide space for production capacity adjustment when policy is tighter.
[中图分类号]
[基金项目]
国家社科基金青年项目“面向技术更替的积分限额交易型产业政策作用机理与政策优化研究”(编号:19CGL056)