基于合作博弈的跨组织技术创新利益分配机制

Benefit distribution mechanism of cross-organizational technological innovation based on the Cooperative Game

摘要:

针对由投入资源类型不同的多家企业和高校组成的跨组织技术创新合作的稳定性问题，基于合作博弈理论对合作内部利益分配机制、投入资源数量进行研究。通过构建企业和高校技术创新合作的利益模型，分析各组织资源投入数量对合作利益的影响，应用算例证明基于Shapley值法利益分配机制满足分配有效性以及参与合作个体合理性，且在给定合作条件下参与各方可以通过数值仿真模拟合作情形，并对各参数进行敏感度分析，通过数值实例验证理论推导结果。研究表明：（1）跨组织技术创新合作效应θo≥?2θ时各组织可以通过合作获益；（2）Shapley值法的利益分配机制保证了合作的稳定性；（3）政府的补贴力度、要素贡献系数、协同效应度、跨组织效应正向影响合作收益，而成本系数产生负向影响。由此，在跨组织技术创新合作实践中，当且仅当跨组织效应满足θo≥?2θ，企业或高校可以选择加入跨合作，并采取Shapley值法的利益分配机制且注意保持密切沟通，同时政府应对参与合作的企业和高校提供补贴。

Abstract:

Aiming at the stability problem of cross-organizational technological innovation cooperation composed of multiple enterprises and universities with different types of input resources, this paper studies the internal benefit distribution mechanism of cooperation and the amount of input resources based on cooperative game theory. By constructing the benefit model of technological innovation cooperation between enterprises and universities, the influence of the amount of resources input of each organization on the benefit of cooperation is analyzed. An example is used to prove that the benefit distribution mechanism based on Shapley value method satisfies the distribution effectiveness and the rationality of the participating individuals. Under given cooperation conditions, the participating parties can simulate the cooperation situation through numerical simulation, and analyze the sensitivity of each parameter. The theoretical results are verified by numerical examples. The research results show that: (1) when the effect of cross-organizational technological innovation cooperation satisfies θo≥?2θ, organizations can benefit from cooperation; (2) the benefit distribution mechanism of Shapley value method ensures the stability of cooperation; (3) the degree of government subsidy, factor contribution coefficient, degree of synergy effect and cross-organization effect have a positive impact on cooperation benefits, while the cost coefficient has a negative impact. Therefore, in the practice of cross-organizational technological innovation cooperation, if and only if the cross-organizational effect is satisfied θo≥?2θ, enterprises or universities can choose to join the cross-cooperation, and adopt the benefit distribution mechanism of Shapley value method and pay attention to maintain close communication. At the same time, the government should provide subsidies to enterprises and universities participating in the cooperation.