数字经济下银行与金融科技竞合关系及优化路径

Co-opetition Relationship between Commercial Banks and Financial Technology and Optimization Path in Digital Economy

摘要:

数字经济背景下，需要正确理解并把握商业银行与金融科技机构之间的竞争与合作关系。从竞合理论视角出发，构建商业银行与金融科技机构竞合关系的演化博弈模型，分析博弈双方各关键参数和惩罚约束对二者合作稳定性的影响，并利用数值仿真对模型及其结果的有效性进行了论证。研究结果表明：博弈系统的演化稳定策略具有不稳定性，商业银行和金融科技机构的竞合决策受到合作超额收益、合作成本、收益和成本分配的合理性等因素的影响；在双方理性水平出现差异时，惩罚机制可以改变系统稳定策略的演化方向，并存在一个违约惩罚临界点，使得博弈双方均选择合作策略。因此政府应该发挥自身职能，制定有效的外部约束，引导双方的竞合关系向更加健康稳定的方向发展。

Abstract:

Under the background of digital economy, it is very important to correctly understand and grasp the co-opetition relationship between commercial banks and financial technology institutions. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model of competition cooperation relationship between commercial banks and financial technology institutions, and uses the theoretical model to analyze the influence of key parameters and penalty constraints on the cooperation stability, and demonstrates the effectiveness of the model and its results by using numerical simulation. The results show that: the evolutionary stability strategy of the game system is unstable, and the co-opetition decisions of commercial banks and financial technology institutions are affected by the factors of excess return, cooperation cost, the rationality of income and cost allocation; when the rationality levels of both sides are different, the penalty mechanism can change the evolution direction of system stability strategy, and there is a critical point of default penalty, which makes both sides choose cooperation strategy. Therefore, the government should play its own functions, formulate effective external constraints, and guide the competition cooperation relationship between the two sides to a more healthy and stable direction.