管理者权力对创新行为的影响 ——异质机构投资者的调节作用

The Influence of the Manager Power on the Innovation Behavior：Regulatory Effects based on the Heterogeneous Institutional Investors

摘要:

以2014~2018年A股上市公司为样本，探究管理者权力对创新行为的影响，并剖析异质机构投资在两者间的调节作用。研究表明：所有权和专家权对创新行为有显著的正向影响，所有权更有利于市场创新，专家权更有利于技术创新；组织权和声誉权对创新行为具有负效应，组织权会抑制技术创新，声誉权对市场创新的负向影响更强；压力抵制型机构投资者能够发挥监督管理作用，通过缓解管理者短期绩效压力，鼓励管理者产生创新行为；压力敏感型机构投资者倾向于与管理者结盟，较难发挥独立监督作用，无助于创新行为产生。

Abstract:

Based on the sample of A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018, this paper explores the relationship between manager power and innovation behavior, and analyzes the regulatory role of heterogeneous institutional investment between them. The results show that ownership power and expert power have a significant positive impact on innovation behavior, ownership power is more conducive to market innovation, and expert power is more conducive to technology innovation; Organization power and reputation power have significant negative effects on innovation behavior. Organization power can inhibit technology innovation, while reputation power has stronger negative effects on market innovation; Pressure-resistant institutional investors can play the role of supervision and governance, and encourage managers to produce innovative behavior by relieving managers' short-term performance pressure; Pressure-sensitive institutional investors tend to form alliances with managers, which makes it difficult for them to play an independent supervision role and does not contribute to the creation of innovation behavior.