Abstract:Based on Stackelberg"s Master-Slave game theory, considering the government subsidies and different sources of generic technology, the three-stage dynamic game model of generic technology marketization development is constructed, and the relevant factors such as marketization development of the industrial generic technology of different supply models are compared and studied under the government subsidies. The result shows that: no matter what the supply model is, the marketization development efforts of enterprises, the optimal sales price of products developed based on generic technology and the economic benefits of the government are always same, but the benefits of marketization development enterprises are higher under the external supply model; Under the external supply generic technology model, the government subsidized resources have been consumed excessively, and the self-supply generic technology model should become a more favorable mode of generic technology R D to save public resources; Customer perception and expected external benefits of marketization development have a good incentive effect on the enterprises" R D efforts, and have a positive impact on the enterprises" and government"s revenue, while R D costs and other factors have a negative impact on enterprises" R D efforts. Finally, according to the conclusions this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to promote the marketization development of generic technology from the aspects of giving full play to the regulation and inducement of the market and the government, encouraging enterprises to carry out “self-supply” R D activities and guiding multi-agent to participate in the vertical collaborative R D of generic technologies.