Abstract:This paper studies the impact of a manufacturer's and a retailer's risk attitude on the optimal decision of green supply chain and the optimization matter under the condition of uncertain market demand. Considering the uncertain market demand, this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model in the green supply chain with manufacturer as the leader and retailer as the follower, and studies the optimal decision of the green supply chain under three situations: risk-averse manufacturer and risk-neutral retailer, risk-neutral manufacturer and risk-averse retailer as well as risk-averse manufacturer and retailer. The paper also analyzes the influence of consumers' acceptance of green products, one-time green investment parameter and risk aversion coefficient of manufacturer and retailer on product greening level and profits of manufacturer and retailer. The paper finds that it is beneficial to improve the greening level of product, profits of supply chain participants by increasing consumers’ acceptance to green products and retailer's risk aversion coefficient, as well as reducing one-time green investment parameter and manufacturer’s risk aversion coefficient. We also show the enlightenment for the manufacturers and the retailers to maximize the green degree of products while maximizing profits includes: launching the sales model of trial and buy for green products, establishing a green product investment cost sharing contract between manufacturers and retailers and building equity cooperation between manufacturers and retailers.