研究在市场需求存在不确定性的情况下制造商、零售商的风险态度对绿色供应链最优决策的影响以及优化问题。考虑市场需求具有不确定性，在以制造商为领导者、零售商为追随者的绿色供应链中建立斯塔克尔伯格（Stackelberg）博弈模型，研究制造商风险规避与零售商风险中性、制造商风险中性与零售商风险规避以及制造商与零售商均风险规避3种情况下绿色供应链的最优决策，并分析消费者绿色产品接受度、一次性研发投入成本系数和制造商与零售商的风险厌恶系数对产品绿色度及制造商与零售商利润的影响。研究表明，提高消费者绿色产品接受度和零售商风险厌恶系数、降低一次性研发投入成本系数和制造商风险厌恶系数有利于提升产品绿色度和供应链参与者的利润。研究发现对使制造商和零售商在获取最大利润的同时最大限度地提高产品绿色度的启示包括：针对绿色产品推出先试后买的销售模式；制造商与零售商之间建立绿色产品研发成本分担契约；制造商与零售商之间建立股权合作关系。

This paper studies the impact of a manufacturer's and a retailer's risk attitude on the optimal decision of green supply chain and the optimization matter under the condition of uncertain market demand. Considering the uncertain market demand, this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model in the green supply chain with manufacturer as the leader and retailer as the follower, and studies the optimal decision of the green supply chain under three situations: risk-averse manufacturer and risk-neutral retailer, risk-neutral manufacturer and risk-averse retailer as well as risk-averse manufacturer and retailer. The paper also analyzes the influence of consumers' acceptance of green products, one-time green investment parameter and risk aversion coefficient of manufacturer and retailer on product greening level and profits of manufacturer and retailer. The paper finds that it is beneficial to improve the greening level of product, profits of supply chain participants by increasing consumers’ acceptance to green products and retailer's risk aversion coefficient, as well as reducing one-time green investment parameter and manufacturer’s risk aversion coefficient. We also show the enlightenment for the manufacturers and the retailers to maximize the green degree of products while maximizing profits includes: launching the sales model of trial and buy for green products, establishing a green product investment cost sharing contract between manufacturers and retailers and building equity cooperation between manufacturers and retailers.

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国家自然科学基金项目“基于过度自信的绿色供应链决策与运营策略研究”(71761015)；江西省教育厅科技项目“基于环境公平视角的绿色供应链优化决策与协调策略研究”(GJJ150475)