Abstract:There has been an analysis of the impact of joint litigation on the settlement of patent infringement disputes from the perspective of game theory. In fact, representative countries have formed two litigation systems: joint litigation and split litigation. Different systems have different effects on the settlement of patent infringement disputes. This paper constructs a two-round game model of patent litigation between patentees and potential infringers under the system of joint litigation and split litigation respectively, and solves and analyzes the game model from the perspective of cost-benefit through reverse induction. The conclusion shows that: the settlement rate of potential infringers is negatively related to the settlement amount, but positively related to the expected income of the patentee after winning the case; the withdrawal rate of the patentee is negatively related to the settlement amount and the settlement cost of the potential infringer, but is related to the potential infringer's litigation The cost is positively correlated. At the same time, in the split litigation game model, the reconciliation rate of potential infringers is also negatively related to the patentee's compensation for litigation costs, and the patentee's withdrawal rate is positively related to the potential infringer's market losses after the infringement judgment. Therefore, the following measures should be taken: to increase the amount of damages, and to use the split litigation system for reference in a timely manner, to increase innovation and research and development for enterprises.